Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order
by Robert Kagan
Knopf

If nothing else, the reticence of many Europeans to join America's pro-war pep rally has provided an opportunity for disparate voices on this side of the pond to vent an opinion usually held at least slightly in check: anti-Europeanism. Timothy Garton Ash merely scratched the surface of the phenomenon in a recent New York Review of Books essay: "The current stereotype of Europeans is easily summarized," he wrote. "Europeans are wimps. They are weak, petulant, disunited, duplicitous, sometimes anti-Semitic and often anti-American appeasers."

Far from a recent phenomenon, contempt for Europe has long been close to the hearts of many Americans. The Continent's opposition to the Iraq crisis, in turn, seems to justify all our negative images — its weak-kneed moralism, pathological aversion to the use of force and arrogant criticism of the United States as a danger to world security are all taken as evidence that Europe is a dying civilization holding onto peace as its last hope for global relevance. One of the more trenchant and influential essays to be written on the subject is Robert Kagan's "Power and Weakness," which appeared in the June/July issue of Policy Review and which the author has quickly expanded and released in book form, under the title "Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order." Kagan's argument is simple: The current transatlantic strife is only the latest symptom of a split that began after World War II, as the United States assumed the role of global police officer and Europe was allowed to rebuild itself economically and socially, guided by a Kantian vision of a unified continent in which commerce and the rule of law would prevent violence from breaking out.

The Europeans, Kagan argues, have been largely successful — despite the occasional political strife and soccer hooliganism, the Continent is peaceful and, if not economically thriving, has at least achieved an enviable quality of life for its citizens. This post-violence paradigm has naturally influenced Europe's foreign policy, and in turn recast the United States as a half-formed Neanderthal of a nation locked in a Hobbesian state of constant conflict. Iraq, to the Europeans, can be contained and neutralized through diplomacy and commerce, tools they used to overcome their own violent tendencies.

Kagan is quick to point out the fatal flaw in this line of thinking: namely, that Europe can be post-violence only because for 50 years it has relied on the United States and its military to do the dirty work. Even when it wants to act, as in Bosnia, Europe is incapable without American leadership, a consequence of decades spent on the sidelines as G.I.s stood watch at the Fulda Gap. One is reminded of Jack Nicholson in A Few Good Men, reprimanding Tom Cruise for questioning the ethics of soldiers who guard him while he sleeps.

But while Kagan's thesis makes sense on the surface, it's ultimately little more than a clever parlor game, a neat dichotomy that ignores too many the inconvenient facts. France, Germany and Belgium may oppose the war in Iraq, but a laundry list of countries feel differently: Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal and the Baltics, to name a few. The book has a following because it is so well-timed; but in a few years, it's hard to imagine it holding much weight. And yet, there's also the possibility that Kagan's little book could help catalyze the current groundswell of anti-Europeanism into a real movement; already we are seeing the Speaker of the House propose severe limits on the importation of French wines. Nor does Kagan provide much in the way of hope for the transatlantic alliance — though he claims "a little common understanding could still go a long way," he also argues for Europe to essentially step aside and let the United States do what it wants.

Such a prescription feeds into the hands of those who would brush off Europe altogether as a bygone culture. But they do so at their own peril: The European Union has a larger population than the United States and one of the world's strongest economies; it is irresponsible at best to argue that, because of Jacques Chirac's intransigence, the United States and Europe will forever disagree on fundamental issues.

But the ultimate test of Kagan's thesis is to ask whether, were there no Iraq crisis, he would still have a point. He obviously thinks so. But there's much to the contrary: US and Europe cooperate on a variety of missions in the Balkans, and NATO is expanding apace. Moreover, it's hard to imagine that Al Gore would be as brusque and anti-Europe as George Bush — a point Kagan notes and dismisses, without clearly explaining why. Indeed, "Of Power and Paradise" is little more than Kagan taking advantage of the zeitgeist; let's just hope that, in doing so, he doesn't make it permanent.

"Of Paradise and Power" is overall a carefully balanced, nuanced book, though one might fault it for fueling an attitude which can very easily collapse into stereotype and reductionism. Kagan does not argue that the United States must go it alone, but he also doesn't provide a particularly rosy prescription for transatlantic cooperation. Instead, in the weakest section of the book, he writes that "a little common understanding could still go a long way." Such a conclusion is unworthy of the tight analysis that precedes it, and it shows how much detail Kagan is willing to ignore to get at his thesis. For Kagan, transatlantic politics is a see-saw in which a once dominant, militaristic Europe has taken up the cause of peace as a way to counterbalance a once weak, now mighty United States. But this neat packaging elides the uniqueness of our current state of affairs. America's force-projection capabilities are unprecedented. Bush's gung-ho moralism has little analog in recent Western history. And the Pacific Rim, fast-growing and increasingly important to US foreign policy, may soon eclipse Europe completely as a locus of global cultural and economic force. Indeed, the looming war in Iraq will likely throw the world community into disarray and could completely rewrite the international balance of power. Kagan's thesis is helpful in that it provides a long view and a context for transatlantic strife, but it is just that — a thesis — and so merely a cautionary starting point for much further discussion.

— Clay Risen (clay@flakmag.com)